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Abstract  
 
Much contemporary social and historical research on problem children and families 
focuses on the different kinds of power deployed in a complex of legal and non-legal 
settings.  This paper reviews socio-legal studies in Europe, Australia and the UK, and 
additional archival evidence in Victoria, Australia, in relation to a shift towards positivist 
and ‘welfarist’ approaches to the problem of child criminality and family regulation from 
the turn of the 20th century.  The aim is to assess the applicability for Australia of trends 
in European social theory that emphasize non-coercive, non-legal correction of families, 
a productive rather than repressive form of power which incites families to seek to align 
their conduct to social norms.  The paper argues that ‘coercive normalization’ - systems 
of knowing and acting upon children and families arising from the penal system and 
‘Coercive normalization and family policing’  Final Draft  to Social and Legal Studies May 2006          p.    1 
images of threat – is a significant presence in the complex of power relations that make 
up a genealogy of family and child regulation in Australia.  
 
Introduction: psy-techniques of power 
 
Sociological and criminological literature in Europe, the United Kingdom and Australia 
acknowledges the late 19th century as a pivotal moment in the construction of the main 
institutional forms of child welfare and the emergence of a modern welfarist approach to 
governing neglected and offending children.  These developments are understood to 
reflect historical movements from a classical to a positivist model of criminology, the 
latter highlighting an individualist, interventionist and scientific study of criminality and 
neglect (Garland, 1985; Naffine, 1992; White and Haines, 2001: 36).   In addition, 
Garland’s (1985) concept of ‘penal-welfare complex’, or Rose and Valverde’s (1998) 
notion of ‘legal complex’, serve to demonstrate the close integration of both legal and 
non-legal interventions in the ways in which problem children and families come to be 
conceived and regulated.  The Children’s Court was an early instance of the growth of 
‘informal power’ as a means to achieve a moderation of behaviour and overall wellbeing, 
as against formal legal process (Harrington, 1992: 177; van Krieken, 2001:6-7).  
Moreover, in many of these accounts power is conceived in terms of psy-interventions, a 
form of regulation that puts the family in a position where it becomes in its own interests 
to conduct itself according to social norms in such matters as education and the healthy 
upbringing of children.  In Donzelot’s Policing of Families (1979:169-234), for example, 
psy-techniques establish a discrepancy between images and reality, which incite families 
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to adjust (or ‘float’) their behaviours towards that ideal image.  Regulating the family, in 
this view, is a kind of ‘governing through freedom’, a productive rather than repressive 
power that incites self-adjustment and presupposes a certain agency or ‘capacity to act’.  
That way of conceiving power draws on the observation that liberal political reason 
presupposes a notion of power as working through the ‘free’ activities of members of the 
population to be governed (Foucault, 1979; Hindess, 2000: 70; Rose, 2004: 174).  This 
paper investigates the pertinence of certain Euro-centred conceptions of power in 
analysing the construction of penal and welfare institutions in Australia, and examines 
the nature of child and family interventions in this formative period in the late 19th and 
early 20th century.  
 
    Comparisons with European evidence may help to draw out the specifically Australian 
mode of ‘imaging’ that sought to regulate the production of the ‘normal family’.  
Drawing on evidence from the UK that uses Donzelot’s understanding of ‘the regulation 
of images’, Nikolas Rose looks at examples of historical process that underpinned 
productive forms of power in relation to family and achieved ‘subjective commitment’ to 
good parenting (Rose, 1990).  He points to the philanthropic, ‘familializing’ projects in 
the late 19th and early 20th century in which experts sought to ‘shape and infuse’ personal 
investments in parenthood and family life.  Rose argues that this would be accomplished 
‘not by coercion or threat’, but rather ‘… through the production of mothers who would 
want hygienic homes and healthy children’ (1990:130).  Later, in the 1940s under the 
tutelage of psychologists such as Donald Winnicott, it is the language and evaluations of 
expertise that ‘bind’ parents of the need to be educated about their own parenting and 
‘Coercive normalization and family policing’  Final Draft  to Social and Legal Studies May 2006          p.    3 
have confidence in their own capacities.  Where the modern family has available to it 
images of the pathological family in the context of scandals, illicit sexuality or violence 
on the part of a minority, ‘… the potency and pervasiveness of normality is reactivated … 
the self-judgement of each of us against its standards is reactivated’ (1990: 203).  Here, 
Rose draws out a self-governing regime that diminishes the significance of coercive 
forms of power in the regulation of parents and children. 
 
    A further analysis of these events and interventions is offered by David Garland (1985) 
in which he argues that discourses of penality concerned with welfarist social and 
criminological interventions in the UK were indicative of a program of reform rather than 
a description of actual interventions.  More recently, Garland also questions the concept 
of freedom and choice in the ‘governmentality’ literature when applied to some forms of 
regulatory power:  does the Foucauldian notion of ‘governing through freedom’ 
understate the presence of constraint and discipline? 
Freedom … generally refers to a capacity to choose one’s actions without external 
contraint.  Freedom (unlike agency) is necessarily a matter of degree – it is the 
configured range of unconstrained choice in which agency can operate.  The truth 
is that the exercise of governmental power, and particularly neo-liberal techniques 
of government, rely on, and stimulate, agency while simultaneously reconfiguring 
(rather than removing) the constraints upon the freedom of choice of the agent 
(Garland, 1997: 197 [emphasis in original]).   
For Garland, this consideration is important for the genealogical method itself.  While it 
is necessary to develop an understanding of rationalities and technologies of governing, it 
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is equally important to consider the specific historical events that give the institutions of 
child and family regulation their present shape. A genealogical understanding of 
rationalities and technologies is relevant if they continue to function in the present (1997: 
202).  It follows, then, that analyses of power that focuses on the historical presence of 
coercion and threat also problematises this kind of power in the present. 
 
    Each of the analytical tools deployed in the above accounts – positivism, the de-
centering of law, governing through freedom - has been important and influential in 
recent socio-legal studies of child and family regulation.  A reconceptualising of power, 
founded largely in the late- Foucauldian literature on ‘governmentality’, has prompted 
questions about the significance of law and normalisation, and in particular the 
continuing importance of juridical kinds of power in the regulation of families and 
children (Foucault, 1991; Ewald, 1991; Hunt, 1992).  Moreover, this literature draws 
heavily on European evidence.  Its relevance for understanding the specificity of relations 
of power in the evolving Australian penal-welfare complex remains relatively unexplored 
(Brown, 2001; Hogg and Carrington, 2001).  In this paper I attempt to identify 
specifically Australian approaches to the restructuring of institutional arrangements 
affecting child and family regulation during the late 19th and early 20th century.   
 
    In particular, I argue that attempts to enforce familial ties and obligations were carried 
out through what could be termed coercive normalisation.  By this I refer to systems of 
knowing and acting upon children and families that arise from the penal apparatus itself, 
systems that sought to lever an adherence to norms of family living through images of 
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threat.  I will attempt to show how these systems entailed an extension of the prison as a 
governing idea beyond the immediate sites of penal institutions; a reinforcement of 
economic power by its transmutation into moral categories; and a way of knowing the 
problem child that was a product of both judicial forms of power and the conduct of the 
human sciences.  The next section reviews the emergence of new powers that 
characterized the Australian institutional landscape, in key areas that allow some points 
of comparison with developments in Europe, and particularly the United Kingdom, to be 
acknowledged:  the growth of a children’s court bureaucracy, the regulation of 
Aboriginal children, and the enrolment of the human sciences in judicial processes.  The 
final part of the paper discusses evidence about the nature of welfarist interventions in 
child and family regulation in both the UK and Australia.  
 
    The paper poses questions about the application of recent social theory to the 
functioning of different kinds of power through an examination of the administrative and 
clinical files of the Children’s Court and Children’s Court Clinic in Victoria, and related 
archives in the Public Records Office in this period.  There is the question, firstly, of  
‘how power works’ in the legal and extra-legal complexity that surrounds children’s 
courts, reformatories and special homes, probation, foster care (‘boarding out’), and the 
psy-knowledge and expertise that came to surround the activities of the court.  This 
question presupposes that a singular conception of power (for example, ‘sovereign’, 
‘disciplinary’, ‘governmental’ power) is not able to adequately capture the scope of 
power effects of these institutions, especially in relation to the wide range of arbitrary  
powers lying in the ‘capilliaries’, at the ‘extremities’ of formal legal institutions 
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(Foucault, 1990;  O’Malley, 1992).  The questions call for close and detailed attention to 
the minutiae of the ‘cross-talk’ that took place within this field.  For although Foucault in 
Discipline and Punish (1977) allows disciplinary power to contain a juridical moment, 
the Australian experience may well reinforce Garland’s view that the governmentality 
literature perhaps underestimates the place of constraint and coercion in historical 
analyses of social regulation (Garland, 1997:197).  Secondly, there is a question of the 
sociological dimension of regulatory powers deriving from the penal system and their 
wider contribution to the production of ‘normal’ families.  The argument here concerns 
the extent to which coercion underpinned ‘incitement to self-govern’ and the significance 
of images of threat in the complexity of powers that make up a specifically Australian 
genealogy of family and child regulation.    
 
Governing through extra-legal powers 
  
Assessing parents and children 
 
The evolving colonial settlement of Australian territories, which authorities regarded as 
largely vacant and unpopulated, necessitated actions by central government that were 
quite novel compared with European contexts of governing.  This applied particularly to 
a population with no historical connection with land or community, and which was 
‘exploratory’ both in relation to the discovery and conquest of new territories, but also in 
the fabrication of a social domain that would accord with at least the broad contours of 
liberal rationalities of governing in the European tradition (Hogg and Carrington, 2001).  
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Perhaps the most effective responsibilisation program was that taking place against the 
backdrop of the promise of land, where a recently arrived or emancipated labouring class 
would be ‘guided and disciplined by the expectation that they might in time and with 
hard work and sober habits ascend to the status of landholders’ (Hogg and Carrington, 
2001: 52).   
 
    These powers of incitement to status acquisition through land ownership may be 
contrasted with the spread of coercive powers into family life following the establishment 
of the industrial schools and reformatory schools. The schools were established in 
Victoria as a consequence of the Neglected and Criminal Children’s Act (1864) and 
reflected the social views of English philanthropists like Mary Carpenter who believed 
that the cause of juvenile delinquency lay in society’s neglect rather than children’s 
innate criminal tendencies.  In the procedures under the Act both offenders and non-
offenders could be apprehended and brought before a court, which would then exercise 
discretion based on the age and circumstances of the child; neglected children could be 
sent to an industrial school for between one and seven years, while a child convicted of 
an offence might be sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a reformatory 
sentence for the same period. The immediate effect of the 1864 legislation was an eight-
fold increase in the numbers of young destitute children in industrial schools, which in 
turn compromised their training roles (Jaggs, 1986; McCallum, 1993:134).  Although the 
industrial schools idea was later abandoned, in part because it failed to establish the 
‘family principle’ in a ‘wholly patriarchal, homely, and affectionate’ manner (Victoria, 
1872), the effect was to deliver a system of monetary assessment of parents who were 
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compelled to contribute to their children’s support.  Where parents had been given 
maintenance orders, the court Clerks were instructed to maintain a surveillance of those 
parents:  
It is particularly required that, in each case where an order for payment of 
maintenance of a child sent to an Industrial School is made by the bench, and the 
person against whom it is made is able to comply with it, the Clerk shall take the 
necessary steps to enforce the order.  When such person leaves the district, the 
Clerk is requested to have him kept in view by the police, and the order enforced 
so long as he is able to pay the amount awarded.  
(Attached hand-written note ‘Extract from the Police Gazette’. Court Records, 
Circulars to Court of Petty Sessions, n.d. [1864] Victorian Public Records Office). 
 
    This kind of monitoring ensured parents’ oversight of their children in the disposal of 
criminal cases -- a child’s good behaviour bond required parents to enter a financial 
commitment, often of significant amounts, to keep the child out of prison. The parents 
themselves could be sent to prison if the child offended again and the parents were not in 
a position to forfeit the money.  The importance of devolved, arbitrary powers of court 
administrators is evidenced in the way maintenance orders were processed.  Parents had 
to plead a case, not to a magistrate, but to the central administration of the court regarding 
their financial capability to support their children.  Once compulsory school attendance 
legislation was enforced after the 1870s, the penalties for truancy placed a further 
financial threat over the family.  With the coming of the children’s courts after 1900, 
extended powers through the linkages between courts and police, and charity workers and 
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probation officers, in addition to the school, added to the number of families and children 
under various kinds of supervision. The carving out of each element of this social domain 
was accompanied by the threat of prison.   
 
    Child and family regulation involved increased centralisation and more detailed 
classification of family that appeared in central welfare offices and on the palimpsest that 
was the child’s record.  A new disciplinary gaze was reflected in the standardized record- 
keeping of such information on parents (McCallum, 1993:138).  From the 1890s, the 
children’s depot (a clearing house for the neglected and offending) was used to observe 
children before they were relocated.  The categories of persons in court reports, as 
required in the 1906 Victorian Children’s Court Act on the child’s ‘habits and mode of 
living’, were produced by newly appointed voluntary probation officers under the control 
of Alfred Clarke who had been brought over from the (adult) Prisoners Aid Society 
(Victoria, 1906 s.9).  He brought to the children’s jurisdiction the concern to identify and 
separate the ‘habitual criminal’ that preoccupied adult penal administrators and police 
throughout the second half of the 19th century, as well as penal disciplinary techniques 
such as indeterminate sentencing. 
 
    Note that extra-legal powers expanded out of the penal establishment rather than from 
broader sociological or cultural shifts, or the humanising influence of the child-savers, 
and carried with them a direct or indirect threat of imprisonment should the family fail to 
respond to required changes in behaviours.  In a devolved system of assessing child 
criminality, one signal instance of 19th century adult penal policy flowing directly to the 
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children’s jurisdiction early in the 20th century was indeterminate sentencing.  Modelled 
on the provisions of the UK Prison Act (1898) and the Prevention of Crime Act (1908), 
this began as a program for adult prisoners heralded in the Royal Commission into 
Victoria Police in 1906 as an economical method of keeping trace of the ‘habitual 
criminal’.  Locating these offenders was an inefficient use of police resources, dependent 
on photographic and physical measures of offenders stored in the central police files.  
The Chief Commissioner of Police laid out a classificatory system whereby it was 
possible to recognize the habitual criminal in quantifiable terms: ‘on his third conviction, 
you would have fair evidence that he is going to live a life of crime’ (Victoria, 1906; para 
1253).  It offered a program of reform in which the criminal came to know, keep trace, 
and act on his own habit:  ‘so a man knowing the system as he would from having it put 
before him while in gaol, and knowing that he was determining his own fate, would 
naturally get out of the more serious class, and go down to the other’ (Victoria, 1906: 
para. 1253). The chief of prisons lauded the economy of indeterminate sentencing as it 
had the effect of ‘creating the desire on the part of those who may be affected by its 
provisions to go beyond it reach’ (Victoria, 1906b).    Adult prisoners given an 
indeterminate sentence were held at the Governor’s pleasure.  
 
    Here was an elaboration of penal administration, an actuarial program and a now 
familiar ‘three strikes’ regime growing directly out of the prison, as well as a system of 
‘governing at a distance’ that constructed the solitary penal subject with responsibility for 
his own reform.  Indeterminate sentencing provisions were transferred directly into the 
children’s jurisdiction and laid the ground for the growth of further arbitrary powers, or 
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what Garland in the UK terms ‘administrative modes of regulation’ (Garland, 1985:190).  
In Victoria, new powers over the movement of children between jail and reformatory 
school, or between foster home and reformatory school, were invested in the relevant 
Minister of State rather than a court, on the advice of charity workers and administrators.   
A child could be removed towards the end of a jail sentence and transferred to a 
reformatory school to begin an indeterminate sentence until aged eighteen.  In addition, 
under Section 333 of the Victorian Crimes Act (1890), non-offending children who 
displayed ‘serious misconduct’ or ‘depraved habits’ while in foster care could be 
transferred to a reformatory school for an indefinite period, at the discretion of the 
Minister.  This move could be made against both neglected and offending children who 
had been placed ‘in service’ or in foster care.  In summary, while the provisions might be 
understood as a program of incitement to self-govern – to choose to regulate one’s own 
conduct according to social norms – they were implemented under the coercive and 
disciplinary constraints of the prison. 
 
Arbitrary powers and the criminalising of Aboriginal children  
 
From the 1860s, when a Royal Commission was appointed to investigate increasing rates 
of Aboriginal mortality, there were already serious allegations about mismanagement at 
the mission stations set up to ‘protect’ Aboriginal communities from the devastation of 
the colonial takeover.  The takeover of land and the spread of European settlement 
continued through the colony of Victoria, morbidity and mortality among Aborigines 
increased and the costs of maintaining mission stations rose.  Over the following decades 
‘Coercive normalization and family policing’  Final Draft  to Social and Legal Studies May 2006          p.    12 
governments moved to rationalize the missions to save money and try to stem the rapid 
decline in the health of Aboriginal communities.  A new Aborigines Protection Act in 
1886 gave the Aborigines Protection Board new powers to define what is ‘an Aborigine’ 
(Victoria, 1886).  The Act reversed the definition of ‘Aboriginal’ so that those people 
who were ‘part-Aboriginal’ became officially defined as ‘white’.  It put in place 
regulations forbidding half-caste children and adults access to the mission stations and 
their families.  The Board attempted to enforce the ‘merging’ with the white population 
by simply declaring that all part-Aborigines under the age of thirty-four were now 
prohibited from the mission stations that had been reserved for the use of Aborigines.  
Children were removed from their parents on the missions when they were old enough to 
work, and under the authority of the Protection Board were sent out to service following a 
period of training, or for adoption with non-Aboriginal families. Older people were given 
three years to find work and alternative accommodation.  
     
    Following removal of the children, the Board reported an ongoing problem of young 
half-castes ‘ready to take advantage’ of anyone receiving rations (Victoria, 1890).  Under 
the Act, rations for half-castes were stopped immediately they reached the lawful age, but 
the Aborigines Board knew that they were drawing on the rations of their families living 
on the mission and that this was a disincentive to ‘moving them on’.  
We found that those who could not make their rations last were those [crossed out 
and replaced by the word] families who had friends and visitors.  Half caste people 
who have no business on the Station.  Only three pounds of meat has been given to 
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these people per week as it was thought best they should to some extent rely on their 
own rations (Victoria, n.d. [early 1890s]).   
The Board’s records show that trouble-making is consistently depicted as activities which 
put at risk the Government’s aim of reducing the size and cost of the missions.  The 
Board wanted ‘our young half-caste people’ to persevere in making a living ‘… 
otherwise they would just return to the mission’.  There were also instances of Aboriginal 
men wanting to marry ‘girls of mixed blood’, who were now forced to run away from the 
missions because such unions were not allowed for under the Act (Victoria, 1890).  The  
thwarting of the law drawn attention to in these reports concerned the constant attempts at 
challenging the regulation that deemed ‘full-bloods’ the only legitimate recipients of 
rations.    
 
    The trouble-making involved in willful sharing of resources demonstrates a racialised 
disparity with white lawbreakers and a complete inversion of the ‘family solution’ to 
crime control advocated by the child savers.  Compared with the European policies of 
building support for the norms of family life, so consistent with an incitement to ‘govern 
through the family’ (Donzelot, 1979:48-95), Aboriginal getting-together with family and 
sharing resources was instead criminalized by those administering the Act.  Resistance to 
the legislated definition of ‘Aborigine’ was itself an offence.  The offence of sharing 
rations was formalized in a new Aborigines Act in 1890 forbidding any person to ‘… take 
whether by purchase or otherwise any goods or chattels issues or distributed to any 
aborigine [as defined under the Act]’, with a penalty on conviction not exceeding twenty 
pounds or in default imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than three 
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months (Victoria, 1890 s. 13).  It was also an offence to ‘harbor any aborigine … unless 
such aborigine shall from illness or from the result of accident or other cause be in urgent 
need of succour’ (Victoria, 1890 s.13).  Children required a certificate to enter the 
mission to visit their family, and being on the mission without the correct papers was also 
an offence. It was these policies of removal that underpinned a longer term criminalizing 
of the ‘young half-caste’.  
 
    In 1900, half-caste orphans were transferred to the care of the Department of Neglected 
Children and Reformatory Schools, placed ‘in service’ or in foster homes, and were 
subject to the same de facto indeterminate sentencing outlined in the 1890 Crimes Act, 
again by-passing any court appearance.  (The term orphan in department documents may 
be a euphemism for children separated from their parents under the earlier mission 
legislation).  But from 1900 this provision to transfer children to reformatories was 
extended to ‘all suitable Aboriginal children whether orphans or otherwise … in order 
that they may have the advantages of being dealt with in the same way as other wards of 
the State’ (Victoria, 1901).  Children sent out to foster care or into ‘service’ could be 
transferred to a reformatory on the basis of reports about their behaviour by their 
guardians, overseen by the penal administration (McCallum, 2005:341).  To summarize: 
the criminalizing of Aboriginal people who were found to be breaking the provisions of 
the Act, by attempting to draw rations and support from their families on the mission, was 
accompanied by another provision that allowed those same children who had been 
separated from their parents and sent into foster care or into ‘service’ to be placed in a 
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reformatory school for an indefinite period, without any appearance before a court.  
These administrative decisions were underpinned by the direct threat of prison.   
 
Arbitrary powers, philanthropy and the psy-sciences 
 
Australian welfare historiography represents the innovation of the children’s court as the 
victory of the ‘child savers’ and reformist philanthropy against a reluctant government 
(Jaggs, 1986).  Were not the welfarist tendencies surrounding the new court a holding 
back of repressive police and state intervention, as Donzelot (1979) suggests about child 
welfare in the European context?  In 19th century Victoria there were longstanding but 
informal networks between the police, magistrates, charity workers, jails, families and 
children, well before the creation of the children’s court.  As we have seen, there was 
considerable administrative energy devoted to enforcing a financial connection between 
parent and child after a legal determination had been made.  The agents of this 
enforcement were charity organisations, the court officers and the police.  Importantly, 
charity workers and later probation officers inserted themselves between the court clerk 
and the police, who together had the task of keeping the parent in sight and responsible – 
specifically, in ensuring that the parent fulfilled a financial responsibility.  The 
motivation to remove children from the streets or from ‘worthless’ families was to save 
the child from crime: 
A single boy or girl over fourteen years of age who has lived a street life gives 
more trouble and worry and is less hopeful than fifty who are under seven or 
eight. If the problem of how to deal with the older street boys and girls is ever to 
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be solved, an effort must be made to strike at the root of the evil in a way that has 
not yet been done.  What is required is a system that will purify the stream at the 
fountain head, instead of merely attempting to do it half way on its course … The 
placing of children out in country homes away from all their evil surroundings, 
under judicious supervision, is the only system that can provide home life for 
these little ones, taken as they are by people free of all cost to the Society. 
Although not adopted in all cases, still they are treated as members of the family, 
thus changing their whole course of life, forgetting their old names and taking the 
names of their foster-parents. 
(State Library of Victoria MS 10051 Victorian Children’s Aid Society Collection.  
Box ½ (a) Presbyterian Society for Neglected and Destitute Children. Report of 
Agent and Ladies’ Committee with Statement of Accounts to 30th September, 
1894) 
 
    But the reports going back to the new court from the charity workers sent out to inspect 
families and homes, rather than acting as a check on the powers of law and government 
under the rubric of welfarism, were one element of a now more regulated process 
assessing a capacity to maintain a family.  In formal court hearings, charity workers 
provided the court with information from their ‘social investigations’ undertaken on the 
condition of the home, the moral worth of the parent(s) and, in some instances, evidence 
about a defendant in a magistrates hearing on criminal matters: 
May 29 1895 Mary Fohey. This child aged 3 years was taken on May 24th & 
adopted on the 25th by Mrs R of Violet Town—the child's case is as follows—her 
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mother is a weak-minded woman morally unable to take care of herself. She has 
another child a month old & no means of support—she is little worthy of help—
but the welfare of the child induced Mrs Sutherland to take the home which 
opportunely offered [sic].  (Victorian Neglected Children's Aid Society: Reports 
and Statement of Accounts for the Years 1895-1911. MS 10051: Box 4/1 Minute 
book of the Sub-committee 8 April 1895-11 December 1901). 
 
    The networks between philanthropy and the police had been established through the 
more general policing of destitute, disorderly and dissolute adult population. Children 
were sent to the Society’s home rather than being locked up with their parents in the 
nearby police cells. The home was seen as an annex of police work, and from 1904 the 
police were paying the rent for the Society’s premises (Victorian Children’s Aid Society, 
1904).  By 1910, besides foundlings, neglected children removed from parent(s) or found 
wandering, and cases where their parent(s) had been locked up, children were brought to 
the home who had absconded from various other institutions or had been charged with 
offences such as loitering, begging, gambling on the streets or theft, with a court hearing 
pending.  The Society’s home became in effect a short-term remand center, and a relay 
point between the police and the court.   Charity workers began to exchange knowledge 
of the child from, and between, the police and the court.  In the form of questions, 
instructions, advice and information, a formal and informal dialogue began to take place 
that established a space for special knowledge of the child, which then found its way into 
the committal procedure.   
 
‘Coercive normalization and family policing’  Final Draft  to Social and Legal Studies May 2006          p.    18 
    So while there was a degree of judicial innovation connected with the passing of the 
Children’s Court Act (1906), in the sense of requiring hearings separate from adults, the 
main change resulting from the Act was the provision of oversight over a fledgling 
probation system, an ever-expanding network of voluntary child supervisors who would 
more systematically link the activities of courts, police and families. It assigned charity 
work under the aegis of the court system, strengthening the coercive powers of its agents, 
and then brought these activities under a new organization of honorary probation officers 
under the court’s control (McCallum, 2004:111).  Whereas once the child-savers had 
sought merely to lend a helping hand, their incorporation within the administration of the 
new children’s court increasingly functioned as a system of knowledge of the child that 
placed the offending and neglected child on a grid of family capacities and obligations, 
and permitted the appearance of delinquency to be calculated in terms that, from the 
period from 1890 to 1940 had been transposed from economic to moral and 
psychological capacities.      
 
    By the time the children’s court clinic opening in 1943, psychiatry, psychology and 
social work expertise had assumed the role earlier performed by charity workers and the 
lay probation officers, and their reports reveal a continuity in the ‘social report’ in their 
mix of physical, moral and occasionally psychological descriptions of family.  In the 
early years of the clinic the psychiatrist mediated between child and court as a primary 
arbiter in questions of disposal.  His final report to the court typically concluded on a 
recommendation for disposal and was followed by a postscript indicating the decision of 
the magistrate: 
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The boy is unlikely to improve in his present environment, and placement in a 
suitable institution appears advisable.  Case Committed to Children’s Welfare 
Department (CWD) … 
… his conduct should improve under suitable guidance on probation. Probation 52 
weeks  …  
….  further period of moral re-education in an institution appears advisable.... 
Committed to Castlemaine Reformatory  
 … placement in a suitable institution and moral re-education are indicated.  He is 
morally defective and is not amenable to control at home. Committed to the CWD. 
(Victoria, 1945-48) 
 
    In the Australian context a significant effect of economic power is in evidence in the 
functioning of extra-legal administrative bodies.  For it is in this space, in the networks 
formalized by the creation of the children’s court as an administrative entity, that the 
nature of responsibility changed from a strictly financial capability to a moral (and 
eventually psychological) capability.  This is how we might understand the notion of psy-
expertise becoming enrolled in legal practice.  In child welfare records in the late19th 
century, terms such as ‘parental capability’ and ‘parental capacity’ meant a capacity to 
pay.  But by the early 20th century these terms had taken on a distinctly moral and 
psychological hue. As the inspectorate widened its surveillance of families throughout the 
countryside, the terminology increasingly focused on the moral rather than the material.  
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Categories of ‘moral defective’ applied to the child by the psychiatrist in charge of the 
clinic were matched by social workers’ less scientifistic descriptions of a child’s mother:   
Mother: Is a rather fat, quiet type. She is to have a baby about April. When 
interviewed she appeared to be lethargic 
Is a well-groomed intelligent looking woman 
A healthy-looking woman who seems co-operative. Has possibly tended to 
‘mother’ C rather much, unless he should prove to be a very dull boy. 
Has been interviewed in the city office of the CWD…Is reported to be a very 
rough type of woman 
Seems not so much unintelligent or ill intentioned as ineffectual…untidily dressed 
in rather soiled clothes…does not appear to understand effective discipline of 
children 
Has a certain air of vagueness which is possibly due to a lack of intelligence 
Showing evidence of her years of work and looks tired and worried 
Does not impress with her personal appearance 
(Children’s Court Clinic Files, Cases 1/45 to 58/47 (1945 to June 1947) 
Human Services Archives) 
 
    It is argued here that the social report provided evidence of a kind that attached a level 
of capacity for family responsibility on the part of family members, particularly the 
mother, and that these measures were given to support a court decision over the possible 
removal of children from families, or in the case of offending children, their disposal to a 
reformatory.  They were reports produced in circumstances involving the exercise of 
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penal powers.  Unlike the dominant role ascribed to philanthropy in the case of the UK, 
of the regulation of images of the pathological against which the modern family could 
adjust its standards, probation officers and later social workers and psychologists in 
Victoria sought to play a governmental role in constructing categories of persons who 
could not be expected to govern themselves or their families, and needed to be trained up 
in the arts of self-governing through extended re-parenting and education.  As Hindess 
(2001) reminds us, liberal political reason has been as much concerned with authoritarian 
and paternalistic rule - the ‘government of unfreedom’ - as with the government of 
autonomous individuals;  that is, that liberalism is predicated on a developmental view of 
individuals and populations, meaning that many will be seen as not – or not yet – ready 
for freedom (Hindess, 2001: 95).  The historical analysis tends to turn on a very specific 
governmental role of the human sciences – the identification and allocation of that part of 
the population to a regime of training and supervision.   
 
    Before concluding, it is worth recapitulating on the theme of Garland’s study of 
‘increasingly autonomous penal power’ in penal-welfare complex in the UK, and his 
observation that welfarist criminological programs in the early 20th century amounted to 
‘discourses of penality’ rather than actual interventions. The present study has paid 
attention to actual interventions as conveyed through decisions of a court and its officers 
– an analysis of the movement of bodies through a system. It is significant therefore that 
these interventions have been ones which produce ‘categories of person’ (Hacking, 1986) 
and authorise the segregation of certain parts of the population deemed to required 
supervision.  There is little evidence that these activities could be described as welfarist 
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in the sense that they supported the kind of therapeutic intervention in the lives of 
children and families that is connoted in the present meaning of the term.  Indeed, studies 
in other states in Australia support this conclusion.  In New South Wales, van Krieken 
describes boarding out as the ‘breaking up of unacceptable families’ and relocation of 
children ‘with respectable working class parents’ (van Krieken, 1991:74).  The foster 
parents had to be willing to be visited, inspected, advised and reprimanded as to the 
proper way to run their homes.  It was through these means, according to the Sydney 
Children’s Relief Board in 1912, that families ‘… have been induced to amend their 
ways’ (1991: 78, 97).  Like Garland, van Krieken saw the administrative changes as ‘… 
primarily at the level of language and terminology’ (van Krieken, 1991: 113).  By the 
1930s, psychological intervention in the NSW children’s court clinic produced categories 
of children based on psychological testing, using recently imported IQ and vocational 
measurement from the US and the UK.  Indeed, van Krieken concluded that  ‘… despite 
the lip service being paid to modernity and science, a major feature of the role of science, 
psychological or social, in child welfare was in fact its minimal impact’ (1991: 124).  
There is abundant evidence that Australian family approaches penalized more than 
supported the family in their contacts with so-called welfare agencies.  Jill Matthews 
describes the context in South Australia at the turn of the 20th century in the following 
terms: 
Any family which failed to interpret correctly the narrow confines of acceptable 
structure and functioning became eligible for punishment. Its children could be 
removed into institutional care (including boarding out and fostering in more 
suitable families). The failed family could become the object of surveillance and 
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disciplinary measures in its own right, fined for allowing truancy or contributing 
to the commission of an offence, subject to visitation by probation, truancy, 
welfare and police officers.  Once ‘on the books’, the so-called sanctity and the 
right to privacy of any family was abandoned and replaced by direct state or 
philanthropic intervention (Matthews, 1984: 85-6). 
 
    On the other hand, powers of ‘inducement’ became more widespread as new linkages 
between law and discipline added to the number of families and children under 
supervision.  In line with Platt’s evidence drawn from the United States when the juvenile 
courts were established, police in the Australian states began to charge children they 
would previously have merely warned or admonished (Seymour, 1997; Platt, 1977).  In 
the Children’s Court files in Victoria in 1906, ‘larceny’ and ‘neglected’ were the most 
common offences brought before the court, but there were as many cases of ‘playing 
football on the street’, ‘selling papers, matches and flowers on the street’, ‘riding bicycle 
on the footpath’, ‘throwing stones’, ‘stealing fruit’ and ‘insulting behaviour’ (Victoria, 
1906c: 619) .  In this respect, combined police and court actions continued the role of 
earlier institutions to ‘tidy up the colony’ by getting destitute children off the streets (van 
Krieken, 1991: 60, 98), but they also constituted significant expansion of informal 
coercive powers.   
   
     The fact that powers exercised by penal administration and ministers of state (as 
distinct from courts) were non-legal powers reinforces Foucault’s point about the rise of 
disciplinary administration as the ‘dark side of law’, where inquiries into the territory of 
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the social becomes concerned with power ‘at its extremities’, ‘where it becomes 
capillary’ and ‘where it is always less legal in character’ (Foucault, 1990: 144; Hunt, 
1992: 8).  It is the arbitrary powers exercised within the penal-welfare complex where 
those with the least accountability might well exercise the most power, but also make it 
difficult to identify any single underlying political rationality in the conduct of penal 
policy; these powers in turn tend to circumvent any homogenizing of motivations and 
politics behind various penal programs and disciplines; and it is in these territories that 
we find the ‘stick’ being wielded to coax people into forming themselves into self-
governing citizens (Carrington, 1991: 110; Vaughan, 2000: 363; Brown, 2001: 113; Hogg 
and Carrington, 2001).   
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
 
While it may be argued that there was an incitement to ‘govern oneself’ by adjusting 
one’s commitments and responsibilities in family life to the ‘power of the norm’, the 
attainment of these subjective states in Victoria, Australia, was also driven by the threat 
of punishment and underpinned by marked increases in what could be described as 
arbitrary forms of power.  From the late 19th century these activities were performed by 
police, the courts, the reformatory and the ‘good country home’, formally overseen by 
regulatory agencies such as probation, and later social work and psychological medicine, 
all authorised by the children’s court.  Even with the appearance of the children’s court 
clinic in most states in the mid-1940s, there is little evidence that these so-called 
‘welfarist’ approaches to child neglect and offending in this period took the form of 
actual interventions by agencies applying programs of ‘incitement to self-government’.  
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Nor is there, as with Garland’s (1985) account in the UK, evidence of a curative 
intervention in the lives of children and families.  On the contrary, tutelary agencies 
developing from the early 20th century allowed wide arbitrary powers and in many 
instances low levels of accountability, with a constant threat that children would be 
removed from families by the use of discretionary powers of a Minister of State or senior 
administrator.   
     
Underpinning the discursive elements of changes towards the new ‘science’ of crime, in 
the period under review, were the attempts to produce new categories of person through 
the assembling of detailed, and indeed infinite knowledge of the ‘habits, conduct and 
mode of living’ of populations needing to be governed.  The specific effects of legal 
process centred around the children’s court was to mandate the conditions of possibility 
for the collection of this ‘social information’ upon which norms came to be constructed, 
and enforced a system of allocating persons on the basis of their measured capacity for 
self-governing.  Donzelot’s (1979) paradoxical - liberator / strangle-hold - descriptions of 
the enrolment of expertise in judicial arenas affecting the family posited new forms of 
power that incite self-government.  Yet the evidence of the agencies of intervention in 
Victoria and elsewhere, reviewed in this article, suggests that coercive normalization is a 
more accurate description of the relations between sovereign, disciplinary and 
governmental powers in Australia.   
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